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The Bicentennial of Calder v. Bull:
In Defense of a Democratic Middle Ground
EDWARD B. FOLEY*
Two centuries ago, in an otherwise inconsequential case, two Supreme Court
justices framed the terms ofa majorjurisprudential debate that has persisted ever
since Justice Chase took the idealist view that the Constitution must be construed
to contain implicitly all those individual rights that would be essential terms of a
fair social contract Justice Iredell, by contrast, argued the skeptical position that,
when there is disagreement among citizens concerning the content ofa fair social
contract, there is no way to knowfor sure who has the correct view.
This essay shows that the debate among constitutional theorists is essentially
the same today as it was two hundred years ago. Accordingly, the only way to
resolve this debate is to adopt a middle ground that gives judges the power to
impose the essential prerequisites ofa fair democratic process-but grants judges
no power to overturn the substantive results ofa fair democratic process. his essay
defends this democratic middle ground against the inevitable attacks'from both the
idealist and skepticalflanks of the debate.
A decade ago, much attention was devoted to the Constitution's bicentennial.
Indeed, Chief Justice Burger left the bench to devote full time to preparing for the
event. No doubt, moreover, in 2003 there will be much celebration of the two
hundredth anniversary of Marbury v. Madison.1 But in this era of commemorating
the formative period of our nation's constitutional order, it is a shame that the
bicentennial of Calder v. BullP has passed unnoticed.
A shame, yet not surprising because, apart from some dicta in a couple of
opinions, Calder is a rather insignificant case. But, oh, what dicta! As students of
constitutional law are taught, the debate between Justices Chase and Iredell in
Calder is essentially the same debate that divides the justices in contemporary
"substantive due process" cases, including the abortion cases, Roe3 and Casey.4
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This debate concerns the issue of when, if ever, it is appropriate for judges to
declare the existence of constitutional rights that are not identified in the text of the
Constitution itself-in other words, of unenumerated constitutional rights. The
constitutional idealists, on one side of this debate, essentially argue that judges
should construe the Constitution as protecting whatever rights would be included
in an ideal social contract for our nation. The constitutional skeptics, on the other
side of the debate, maintain that because reasonable minds may differ on the content
of an ideal social contract, judges have no basis for invalidating legislation when the
Constitution does not identify an asserted right as one to be protected from
legislative infringement.
This debate, it should be clear, is distinct from issues involving the
interpretation of enumerated constitutional rights, such as the freedom of speech or
the right of the people to keep and bear arms.5 Whatever the interpretative
difficulties involving these textual provisions, they necessarily pale in comparison
to the problems of identifying constitutional rights not even mentioned in the text
of the document. This distinction between unenumerated and enumerated rights is
sound even though the Constitution contains provisions, like the Ninth Amendment
that suggest that at least some unenumerated rights are equally deserving of
constitutional status as enumerated rights.6 After all, the Ninth Amendment (by
definition) does not tell us what unenumerated rights deserve this special status.7
Calder v. Bull is an excellent introduction to the issue of unenumerated rights,
not only because the case shows that the debate between idealists and skeptics has
existed since the very beginning of the Constitution's history, but also because the
two sides are so succinctly and lucidly presented in the opinions of Chase and
Iredell. In recent years, scholars of constitutional law have attempted to develop
more sophisticated versions of both the idealist and the skeptical positions. But these
academic exercises, while erudite and illuminating, are essentially just elaborations
of the arguments originally presented by Chase and Iredell in 1798. Indeed, as we
shall see by closely examining the work of two contemporary scholars, one an
idealist and the other a skeptic, it is remarkable how similar their arguments are to
their original counterparts.
Given that nothing written in two hundred years has conclusively settled the
debate, no one can expect to offer any new arguments that automatically will
convince one side or the other to abandon its position. Instead, I propose that the
persistence of the debate is reason enough to adopt a middle-ground position that
I call democracy-defining constitutionalism. This middle-ground position holds that
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. I & I.
6 See Charles Black, On Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment, in THE RIG- RErAINED
BY THE PEOPLE (Randy Bamett ed., 1989).
7 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (stating "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people!).
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judges should declare the existence of unenumerated constitutional rights only to
the extent that they are necessary to make sure that laws are adopted in a legislative
process that qualifies as democratic.
This middle-ground position itself is not new. Its most well-known advocate is
John Ely,8 and his account of'it drew upon the famous footnote four of Carolene
Products,9 which itself just celebrated its sixtieth birthday. But my defense of
democracy-defining constitutionalism differs from Ely's insofar as it openly
embraces the idealist premises of Justice Chase and his contemporary analogues.
As we shall see, Ely's argument for the democratic middle ground was fatally
flawed insofar as it attempted to articulate a theory of unenumerated constitutional
rights without relying upon the kind of philosophical premises that underlie the
idealist position.
Although the premises of the idealist position are sound, its conclusions are not
As our review of idealist reasoning will reveal, a faithful adherence to the idealist
premise of civic equality (all citizens should have equal rights ofparticipation in the
resolution of politically controversial issues) should lead us to adopt something
close to the skeptic's position on the issue ofjudicially enforceable unenumerated
constitutional rights. But we should not accept the skeptic's position automatically.
The pure, unadulterated skepticism expressed by Iredell and his contemporary
analogues goes too far. The skeptics do not-indeed, could not--reject the premise
of civic equality. Given this premise, as I shall explain, it is appropriate for judges
to insist that legislatures respect those rights essential for the operation of
democratic political processes. In this way, democracy-defining constitutionalism
offers a middle-ground position that both idealists and skeptics should be able to
accept. But even if dyed-in-the-wool partisans of one side or the other refuse to
abandon their previous positions, I hope that a review of the ancient debate between
Chase and Iredell, as well as its contemporary equivalent, will convince the open-
minded reader that the only possibility of ever resolving the debate lies in the
middle-ground position.
I. THE CASE ITSELF
Calder concerned a dispute over the validity of a will. As I tell my students,
imagine a dispute between disgruntled children who did not want their father's
mistress to inherit under his will and so claimed that he was of unsound mind when
he wrote the will. The actual facts of the case are not as colorful, but they present
exactly the same constitutional question.
A Connecticut probate court invalidated the will, but the state's legislature
8 JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISumUsT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
9 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, n.4 (1938); see also ELY, supra
note 8, at 75-77.
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nullified the court's decree and ordered a new hearing on the will's validity. At the
new hearing, the probate court declared the will valid. The decedent's heirs, who
would have inherited under the state's intestacy laws, appealed the new decision on
the ground that the legislature's act was an "ex post facto law" in violation of
Article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution. Connecticut's Supreme Court
rejected this argument; and the United States Supreme Court affirmed. Each justice
wrote his own opinion, yet they all agreed that the "ex post facto" clause of the new
Constitution did not apply in this context.10
Justice Chase also considered whether the legislature's act might still be
unconstitutional according to general principles of constitutional law. He ultimately
concluded that the state law was not unconstitutional pursuant to such principles
because the law did not violate any "vested rights" of the decedent's heirs.11
Nonetheless, he went out of his way to express his belief that any legislation
violating vested rights would be unconstitutional. In doing so, he explained why he
believed that legislation contrary to general principles of constitutional law would
be null and void even if these general principles were not expressly mentioned in
the text of the Constitution itself. It is this account of general constitutional
principles that deserves our careful consideration.
First of all, at the very outset of Justice Chase's passage, he makes it clear that
he subscribes to a social contract theory of government.12 As he explains, the
purpose of the social contract is to establish a just system of government for the
members of society. Moreover, he makes clear his belief that the purpose of a
society's constitution is to embody the terms of this just social contract.13 In effect
10 Only fourjustices heard the case, and three--Chase, Paterson, and Iredell-concurred in
the belief that the "ex post facto" clause applied only to criminal laws. Justice Iredell also
considered the act of the state's legislature as being judicial in nature and thus beyond the scope
of the "ex post facto" clause. Justice Cushing's two-sentence opinion merely says that the act "is
not touched by the Federal Constitution" whether it is judicial or legislative in nature. See Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,400 (1798).
Interestingly, in a case decided just this year, Justice Thomas has urged his colleagues to
reconsider the view that the ex post facto clause applies only to criminal laws. See Eastern
Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. CL 2131,2145 (1998) (Thomas, J., concurring).
I 1 See Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 394.
12 he purposes for which men enter into society will determine the nature and terms of the
social compact" Id. at 388 (italics omitted). The full passage of Justice Chase is quoted in full in
the Appendix.
13 "The people of the United States erected their Constitutions, or forms of government, to
establish justice, to promote the general welfare, to secure the blessings of liberty; and to protect
their persons and property from violence." Id. This sentence immediately precedes the one stating
that "[t]he purposes for which men enter into society will deternine the nature and terms of the
social compact," thus equating the phrase "social contract' with the antecedent reference to
"Constitutions."
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for Chase, a society's constitution is its social contract, and thus it should be
understood that the ultimate purpose of the Constitution is the same as the ultimate
purpose of the social contract.
Next, Chase articulates his belief that a just social contract would not grant a
legislature unlimited powers but instead would protect the liberty and property of
individual citizens. 14 In a truly wonderful sentence, Chase asserts his view that any
legislation contrary to the essential terms of ajust social contract is necessarily null
and void. "An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the
great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise
of legislative authority."15 Given that Chase equates the Constitution with the social
compact, it obviously follows for him that any legislation violating an essential term
of the social contract must be unconstitutional.
A key part of Chase's argument is that a constitution should be construed
according to its fundamental purposes. He forthrightly acknowledges that he is
contemplating a situation in which the text of a written constitution is silent on
whether a particular piece of legislation is permitted or prohibited. In this situation,
rather than assuming that the legislature is permitted to do anything that the text of
the Constitution does not expressly prohibit, Chase argues that it should be assumed,
instead, that the legislature is prohibited from doing anything that would be
inconsistent with the Constitution's fundamental purposes. 16 And because the
Constitution's most basic purpose is to secure a just system of government for
society, any legislation that is flagrantly unjust must be deemed unconstitutional.
Chase closes his argument with this pronouncement: 'To maintain that our Federal,
or State, Legislature possesses such powers, if they had not been expressly
restrained; would, in my opinion, be a political heresy, altogether inadmissible in
our free republican governments.' 17
Chase's theory of unspecified constitutional rights drew a direct response from
Justice Iredell.
First, Iredell makes absolutely clear that he accepts the idea that judges would
nullify legislation with specific provisions of a written constitution. 18 In other
words, Iredell anticipates the doctrine of judicial review as articulated by the
14 
"There are certain vital principles in our free Republican governments, which will
determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power, [for example, a law
purporting] to take away that security for personal liberty, or private property, for the protection
whereof the government was established." Id.
151d.
16
' "t is against all reason and justice, for a people to intrust a Legislature with, [certain]
powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it." Id.
17 Id. at 388-89.
18
'f any act of Congress, or of the Legislature of a state, violates those constitutional
provisions, it is unquestionably void...." Id. at 399.
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Supreme Court five years later in Marbury v. Madison.19 To be sure, Iredell says
that this power ofjudicial review should be used hesitantly, only when the text of
the Constitution is so clear that there can be no doubt that the legislation is blatantly
unconstitutional.20 Thus, using modem terms, we would call Iredell a champion of
judicial restraint. But judicial restraint is not the same as judicial impotence, and
Iredell announces that, when necessary, he is prepared to exercise the judicial
power-indeed duty (as Marbury also conceived it)-to invalidate legislation
contrary to a written constitution.
Iredell, however, sees judicial enforcement of unspecified constitutional
principles as presenting an entirely separate matter. If there is nothing written in a
constitution to constrain the scope of legislative power, then judges have no basis
for invalidating legislation on the ground of unconstitutionality. Iredell
acknowledges that "some speculative jurists"21 believe that legislation contrary to
"natural justice" is inherently void.2 2 But, Iredell responds, judges lack the power
to declare legislation void for this reason.23
Iredell's point is an institutional one. As long as a written constitution
establishes a legislature without limitations on its legislative power, then any law
enacted by the legislature is necessarily "lawfully enacted," within the scope of its
authority as delegated by the people in the Constitution.24 And, as long as the
legislature is acting within the scope of its constitutionally delegated authority, then
the judiciary would be exceeding its own authority under the constitution if it
declared the legislation invalid.
To bolster his institutional argument, Iredell articulates a classic statement of
the skeptical position. He states, "[t]he ideas of natural justice are regulated by no
fixed standard.' 2 5 He adds, "[t]he ablest and the purest men have differed upon the
subject" 26 These two skeptical assertions, while closely related, are subtly distinct
The first we might call intrinsic skepticism: the very subject of 'natural justice" has
no definite content to be grasped. Even if human minds were perfect, it would not
matter because questions of justice are inherently indeterminate. The second, by
contrast, we might call extrinsic skepticism: even if there are objective right answers
19 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
20 
"nT'he Court will never resort to that authority, but in a clear and urgent case." Calder, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) at 399.
21 Id at 398.
22 See id. at 399.
23 "[Tihe Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment,
contrary to the principles of natural justice." Id.
24 See id. at 398.
25 Id. at 399.
26 Id.
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to questions ofjustice, there is no agreement on what they are. As Iredell states,
even among the most intelligent and virtuous of citizens there is deep disagreement
about what justice requires.27
Whether the disagreement is caused by the inherent nature of the topic of
justice or, instead, the inherent imperfections of even the "ablest and purest" of
minds, the fact of the disagreement remains. And the existence of this disagreement
feeds into Iredell's institutional argument. When intelligent and virtuous citizens
divide into two opposing camps on some issue of justice, and there is no way for
humans to step onto some "objective" plateau from which to correctly resolve this
debate, then who is to say that the legislature's views on this debate are inferior to
the judiciary's? In Iredell's own words, "all that the Court could properly say, in
such an event would be, that the Legislature possessed of an equal right of opinion,
had passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the
abstract principles of natural justice."28 This inability of the Court to say that its
opinion is superior to the legislature's is the very essence of the skeptical position.
Thus, in Calder v. Bull, Justices Chase and Iredell express exactly opposite
views on the issue of unenumerated constitutional rights. Their dispute, although
inconsequential to the result of the particular case before them, frames the issue that
has bedeviled both the Court and commentators for the past two hundred years. This
issue is precisely the point of contention that divides the idealist and skeptical
positions. The idealist believes that it is possible to identify essential provisions of
a fair social contract through the powers of human reason. As Chase stated, certain
legislative enactments would be "against all reason and justice.'2 9 If an enactment
contradicts one of these identifiable essential elements of justice, it is
unconstitutional because a silent constitution is presumed to incorporate these
essential terms, given its overriding purpose. But a necessary premise of this idealist
argument is that "the great first principles of the social contract '30 can be
indisputably identifed-that any fair-minded person exercising the power of human
reason would subscribe to them.
Yet this premise of the idealist argument is precisely what the skeptic rejects.
As we have seen, the heart of Iredell's retort to Chase is that not even the best and
brightest of citizens can agree on the essential terms of a fair social contract. And
so, it is concerning this crucial question-whether any essential elements of a fair
social contract are identifiable by reason-that we should see what additional
insight or guidance, if any, the benefit of two hundred years of history has given us.
27 This distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic skepticism differs from Dworkin's
distinction between internal and external skepticism. See RONAiD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 78-
83 (1986).
28 Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 399.




II. THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
This essay will not review all two hundred years of developments in
constitutional jurisprudence concerning the great debate between idealists and
skeptics. Instead, we shall fast forward to the present and examine the arguments
advanced by two of today's leading scholars: one an idealist and the other a skeptic.
While these two scholars are hardly alone in advocating their points of view, they
make especially thoughtful arguments for their respective positions. Thus, by
examining these arguments, we can evaluate how far (if at all) the debate between
idealists and skeptics has developed since Calder v. Bull.
A. The Contemporary Idealist
The exemplary contemporary idealist is James E. Fleming.3 1 Indeed, Fleming
is unabashedly idealistic. He calls his approach a "Constitution-perfecting" theory
ofjudicial review,32 openly embracing the label of perfectionist that skeptics have
pejoratively used against idealists. 33 Fleming believes the judge's task is to make
the Constitution the best it can be,34 which includes the judicial identification of
constitutional rights unmentioned in the text of the Constitution itself.35
Moreover, Fleming's method for the identification of these unenumerated
rights is political philosophy. He relies in particular on the recent work of the
famous philosopher John Rawls, whose project is to identify the essential terms of
a fair social contract for our society.36 For Fleming, what justifies this judicial
reliance on political philosophy is the Constitution's own goal of being a social
charter establishing a fair political system for our nation. Fleming states that he
31 Fleming's theory is developed in two important articles. James E. Fleming, Constructing
the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV. 211 (1993) [hereinafter Substantive Constitution];
James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1995) [hereinafter
Deliberative Autonomy].
32 See Substantive Constitution, supra note 31, at 218-19; Deliberative Autonomy, supra
note 31, at 15.
33 For a well-known earlier criticism of constitutional perfectionism, see Henry P. Monaghan,
Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981).
34 Fleming follows Ronald Dworkin in arguing that constitutional interpretation 'rquir[es]
the construction of a substantive political theory (or scheme ofprinciples) that bestfits andjustifies
our constitutional document and underlying constitutional order as a whole." Deliberative
Autonomy, supra note 3 1, at 14 (emphasis added) (citing DWORKIN, supra note 27).
35 See Deliberative Autonomy, supra note 31, at 56.
36 See JOHN RAwLs, POLmCAL LmERALISM (1993). This book is a refinement of Rawls's
earlier A Theory of Justice (1971) insofar as he now limits what he calls the "constitutional
essentials" to certain basic civil liberties, thereby excluding from the domain of constitutional law
the principles he earlier developed concerning economic and social inequalities. See id at 227-30.
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"conceives our Constitution as embodying (or aspiring to embody) a coherent
scheme of equal basic liberties, or fair terms of social cooperation on the basis of
mutual respect and trust, for our constitutional democracy."37
Thus, there can be no doubt that Fleming is a contemporary analogue of Justice
Chase. In fact, Fleming cites Chase's opinion in Calder as one of his intellectual
forebears.38 The only question is whether Fleming adds anything to Chase's
argument by relying on Rawls's political philosophy as the way to identify the
essential content of a fair social contract.39
Rawls builds his political philosophy on the premise that all normal humans are
mentally equipped with two "moral" powers. 40 One is the ability of individuals to
formulate personal goals and objectives--that is, to decide for themselves what they
want to accomplish in life (to determine their life ambitions). The other moral
power is the ability to respect the interests of other persons-in other words, the
capacity to ascertain and abide by fair terms of social cooperation with other
members of society. For both Rawls and Fleming, these two powers require the
existence of certain constitutional rights, namely those rights that individuals need
as prerequisites for exercising these two powers.41 Fleming groups these rights
under two headings, one corresponding to each moral power. 'Deliberative
autonomy" is the term Fleming gives to those rights necessary for individuals to
formulate personal objectives and goals in life.42 ' Deliberative democracy" is the
term he uses for those rights necessary for individuals to seek fair terms of social
cooperation with their fellow citizens. 43
A major theme of Fleming's work is that deliberative democracy without
deliberative autonomy is only half a constitution, and an unstable one at that.44
Fleming's approach views deliberative autonomy and deliberative democracy as
twin pillars underlying all the individual rights necessary for a constitution to
37 Substantive Constitution, supra note 3 1, at 290; Deliberative Autonomy, supra note 3 1,
at 20.
38 See Deliberative Autonomy, supra note 31, at 26.
39 Although Flemingprotests thathis "constitutional constructivismis not atheory ofnatural
law or natural rights," he admits that its "principles are aspirational-the principles to which we
as a people aspire, and for which we as a people stand-and may not be fully realized in our
historical practices, statute books, and common law." Id at 16. Thus, Fleming is undeniably an
idealist, given his belief that the Constitution should be construed to conform to these aspirational
principles.
40 See RAWLS, supra note 36, at 302.
41 See Deliberative Autonomy, supra note 31, at 18.
4 2 See id
43 See Substantive Constitution, supra note 31, at 292; Deliberative Autonomy, supra note
3 1, at 19.
44 See DeliberativeAutonomy, supra note 31, at 19.
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protect; without both pillars the constitution collapses.45 Deliberative democracy is
not enough because citizens are not merely social beings. Instead, they are
individuals who need a zone of personal sovereignty within which they can make
decisions for themselves independently-decisions over which society as a whole
cannot exercise a veto (no matter how democratically a society might choose to
exercise a veto power).46
Although Fleming's idea of deliberative autonomy sounds attractive, the
problem is pinning down exactly what rights should be judicially protected
according to this idea. Fleming's (admittedly incomplete) list includes some
familiar subjects of recent constitutional litigation: the right of consenting adults to
engage in sexual relations, the right of extended family members to live together,
and the right of medical patients to refuse unwanted treatments. 47 The question
inevitably arises why these rights and not others. For example, why not a right to
engage in prostitution? Or a right of friends to live together? Or a right to consume
whatever drugs one wishes?
Fleming disclaims that deliberative autonomy should be understood to
encompass these asserted rights. Deliberative autonomy is not, he says, a libertarian
notion that individuals are free to do whatever they please as long as they do not
interfere with the pleasure of others.48 Instead, according to Fleming, deliberative
autonomy protects only those rights that are "significant" to the ability of
individuals to define and accomplish their "important" personal objectives in life. 9
But it is not at all clear why, even limited in this way, deliberative autonomy
would not encompass the additional rights asserted. The right to consume mind-
altering drugs may be necessary, either to relieve physical or psychic pain, or to
pursue an aesthetic vision. (Consider all the important literature, art, and music
produced as a result of hallucinogenic drugs.)50 The right of fraternity brothers to
share a dwelling may be just as important to some persons' conceptions of a good
life as the right of biological cousins to live together. (Monastic orders, after all, are
based on the premise that monks should live with their spiritual kin rather than their
biological relatives.) Even the right to engage in prostitution may be necessary to
achieve important ambitions in life. (Imagine a so-called "high-class hooker" who
45 See id. at 3-4.
46 See id. at 32.
47 See id. at 7 & n.27 (collecting the relevant cases).
48 See id. at 45.
49 See id. at 40-41.
50 Also, if Fleming would support the right of religious sects to use peyote to pursue their
spiritual ends, as would the dissenters in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), then
it would be contrary to his Rawlsian impartiality among competing conceptions of the good life
to deny atheists an equal right to use similar drugs to pursue their most cherished personal
objectives.
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escorts her affluent clients to the opera, theater, and symphony, as well as expensive
restaurants and "high-society" parties, and who otherwise might not be able to enter
this exclusive world of privilege.) In short, Fleming's idea of deliberative autonomy
faces severe line-drawing problems.
Moreover, these line-drawing problems cut both ways. Just as arguments can
be made to extend the scope of deliberative autonomy to encompass rights that
Fleming would leave unprotected, so too can arguments be made to exclude from
the scope of deliberative autonomy rights that Fleming would wish to include. If the
Constitution does not protect the right to engage in sexual relations in exchange for
financial remuneration, then why should the Constitution be construed as permitting
casual extramarital sex even when there is no obvious economic transaction
involved? (Some sociologists might argue that the sexual component of a casual
dating relationship is one part of a complex bargain between two self-interested
partners, making their relationship different from conventional prostitution only in
degree.) It cannot be that the right to have a one-night fling with a previous stranger
is significant to formulating or achieving a life plan, whereas the right to sell (or
purchase) sex is not.
Similarly, if it is not sufficiently important that close fiiends or spiritual kin
have the right to live in a neighborhood zoned for nuclear-family housing, then it
cannot be sufficiently important for cousins to defeat this kind of zoning law. After
all, any argument that could justify separating friends (they can still visit frequently,
even if they cannot move in together) applies just as well to cousins. Likewise, if
there are strong enough reasons to prevent people from experimenting with
marijuana, then presumably there are good enough reasons to require people to
continue life-sustaining medi6al treatment. After all, the cessation of life-sustaining
treatment will, by definition, certainly cause death, whereas the experimental use
of marijuana has virtually no risk of fatality.
Moreover, these line-drawing problems cannot be avoided even if Fleming
were to retreat to the robust libertarian position that adults should be free to do
whatever they wish as long as they do not harm anyone else. It is always debatable
whether one person's conduct causes harm to others.51 Suicide can harm family
members and friends. Multi-family dwellings in a single-family neighborhood can
lower property values and interfere with the neighbors' peaceful enjoyment of their
property.52 Finally, sexual promiscuity among consenting adults, in addition to
51 For a philosophically sophisticated discussion of the limits of extreme libertarianisn, see
AMY GutMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 230-73 (1996).
52 Some families may have moved into a particular neighborhood specifically relying on
existing zoning laws restricting housing to single-family homes. If some neighborhoods are zoned
this way to accommodate this preference, while other neighborhoods are zoned for multi-family
housing to accommodate different lifestyle choices, why should those who want multi-family
dwellings be able to eliminate all single-family neighborhoods?
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spreading the risk of disease, can change the culture of society. For example,
children growing up in a culture where sexual promiscuity is widely accepted may
be tempted to experiment with sex at earlier ages than they otherwise would, and
thus parents who (for whatever reason) wish to raise their children to remain
abstinent until marriage may have a harder time at this parenting task than if
nonmarital sex were illegal.
Also, even the most ardent libertarians must agree that some citizens are not
competent to make certain decisions regarding their own self-interest, and,
therefore, in some circumstances paternalism is justified. Mentally ill individuals
who are suicidal need to be restrained so that (hopefully) psychiatric treatment may
cure them of their extreme depression. But once this obvious point is acknowledged,
new line-drawing problems arise. Are cancer patients in extreme pain competent to
make a decision to commit suicide? What if they are being pressured by relatives,
or even insurance companies, to pull the plug before they are ready? Reasonable
libertarians can disagree about exactly where to draw the line dividing justified from
unjustified paternalism.
In an essay written before the Supreme Court decided the recent physician-
assisted suicide cases,53 Fleming argued that it would be a "constitutional tragedy"
if the Constitution did not grant terminally ill patients the right to secure the services
of doctors in deciding when and how to end their lives.54 According to Fleming,
"the state's proscription of physician-assisted suicide is tantamount to conscription
of terminally ill persons into involuntary servitude." 55 This rhetoric seems
overstated: after all, laws against physician-assisted suicide simply prohibit the
medical profession from aiding the attempts of individuals to end their lives; this
prohibition does not stop those who really want to kill themselves from doing so.
In any event, as the Supreme Court itself recognized, Fleming's moral
argument is better addressed to a legislative rather than judicial forum.56 There are
indeed plausible moral arguments that may persuade the people of a state, or their
elected representatives, to permit certain forms of physician-assisted suicide in
narrowly limited and carefully controlled circumstances. But there are also plausible
moral arguments on the other side that might persuade the people or the legislature
to reject categorically any form of physician-assisted suicide. One such argument
is the potential harm to the medical profession-the idea that doctors should have
an undivided loyalty to healing is hardly untenable. Another argument is that pain
should always be treated with efforts to end the pain, rather than the patient's life,
even if the result is to sedate the patient.
53 See Washington v. GluCksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct 2293
(1997).
54 See James Flefming, Constitutional Tragedy in Dying, 24 FORDHAMURB. LJ. 881 (1997).
55 Id. at 882.
56 See Washington, 117 S. Ct. at 2275.
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Fleming would argue that it is deeply unfair to deny individuals the right to
decide whether they prefer immediate death to prolonged sedation. But, in the
absence of a constitutional clause specifically giving individuals this right, the moral
issue of fairness in this context should be decided by the people or their elected
representatives rather than by an unelected, life-tenured court. We can imagine
Fleming and his allies making their moral argument in a public hearing before an
elected assembly, and we can imagine members of this assembly debating the
merits of this moral argument along with the counterarguments against it. Suppose
that Fleming loses in the legislature because, after careful consideration of the
competing moral arguments, a majority of the elected representatives conclude that
the risks of subtle coercion and corruption among doctors are simply too great to let
doctors help their patients kill themselves. What justification would an unelected,
life-tenured court have for overturning the legislature's moral judgment just because
a majority of the court's members disagreed with the legislature's conclusion
concerning how to balance the competing moral considerations? As Iredell observed
two hundred years ago, in the absence of a specific constitutional provision on point,
the institutional authority to make this moral judgment lies with the legislature even
if the judiciary considers the legislature's moral judgment erroneous.57
Now, the argument is sometimes made that the Supreme Court is sufficiently
democratic to justify substituting its moral judgments for those made by elected
legislatures. After all, members of the Court are appointed by an elected President,
with the approval of an elected Senate, and the Court's decisions are reversible by
constitutional amendment But given the extraordinary obstacles of the amendment
process-the necessity of securing approval from thirty-eight different legislative
bodies, after obtaining two-thirds supermajorities in both houses of Congress-this
degree of popular control over the Supreme Court is insufficient to make it a truly
democratic institution. It would be different if the independence of the Supreme
Court were structured much like the independence of the Federal Reserve, whose
decisions Congress can overturn by ordinary legislation. There is nothing
intrinsically undemocratic about a legislature delegating difficult decisions to an
appointed body of special experts, so long as majoritarian institutions of government
retain ultimate control over the exercise of the delegated authority.58 This
57 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798).
58 The argument for majority rule is that no other decisional procedure distributes political
power as equally among all citizens in society. See ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRmCS
139-41 (1989) (explaining May's Theorem). If one-third plus one can block the considered
judgment of two-thirds minus one on a contentious issue of social policy, a small group of citizens
necessarily exercises political control over a much larger group. While the citizenry as a whole
might wish a delegated legislature to follow certain supermajoritarian procedures, democratic
fairness requires that the people themselves retain the authority to change the laws of their society
by majority vote.
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proposition remains true even if the field of expertise is moral philosophy. Thus, it
is perfectly consistent with democracy for a democratic legislature to submit the
contentious issue of physician-assisted suicide, or any similarly divisive issue
concerning personal autonomy, to a panel of appointed experts, if the legislature (or
electorate itself) retains the authority (by majority vote) to overrule the panel's
determination. 59
Indeed, rather than setting up an ad hoe panel of moral experts for each delicate
issue as it arises, it is probably much more preferable to establish a permanent panel
of professional experts, appointed for a fairly lengthy term of years, so that over
time the institution can establish real independence through the development of
credibility. In this way, the legislature is likely to think long and hard before
overturning the well-reasoned judgment of the moral experts that individuals should
be entitled to engage in a certain form of personal autonomy, even in the face of
widespread social disapproval. But if, notwithstanding the judgment of the experts,
a majority of citizens truly and deeply believe that it would be morally wrong to
permit individuals to exercise a certain personal freedom-like physician-assisted
suicide-then it would be undemocratic to deny them (or their elected
representatives) the power to put this moral judgment into law. Because the present
procedures for a constitutional amendment effectively deny the people this power,
if the Supreme Court asserts judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights of
personal autonomy, its action is inconsistent with the democratic sovereignty of
equal citizens. (The Supreme Court apparently understood this truth in the actual
physician-assisted suicide cases recently decided,60 although the Court did not
disavow entirely its previously asserted authority to identify unenumerated rights
of personal autonomy. 61)
It is unclear how Fleming would respond to this line of reasoning because he
largely ignores the institutional issue of who should decide controversial questions
concerning the proper scope of personal liberties. Instead, Fleming devotes his
59 The legislature of New York did just this on the issue of physician-assisted suicide. See
Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
60 
"By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a
great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action." Glucksberg,
117 S. Ct. at 2267-68.
61
[The development of this Court's substantive-due-process jurisprudence has been a
process whereby the outlines of the 'liberty' specially protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment-never fully clarified, to be sure, and perhaps not capable of being fully
clarified-have at least been carefully refined by concrete examples involving fundamental
rights found to be deeply rooted in our legal tradition. This approach tends to rein in the
subjective elements that are necessarily present in due-process judicial review.
Id at2268.
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attention to developing substantive arguments concerning why certain personal
liberties should be safe from governmental interference notwithstanding the
countervailing moral arguments that permitting these liberties would harm other
individuals or society as a Whole. Even if I share Fleming's (largely) libertarian
views, the pressing institutional problem remains: what if a majority of the people,
or their elected representatives, after thoughtfully considering the merits of
Fleming's arguments, reject them in favor of the counterarguments? Some political
institution must decide whether Fleming is right or wrong. In our current system of
government, the institutional choice is between an elected legislature (or a statewide
referendum) and an unelected and life-tenured tribunal, with only nine members,
whose decisions are effectively immune from popular revision. Given this choice,
it is hard to see the latter alternative as more consistent with the democratic idea that
all citizens should ultimately share equal control over the affairs of state.
B. The Contemporary Skeptic
Although Fleming fails to confront the force of this institutional objection,
Jeremy Waldron, our exemplary neo-Iredellian, makes it the centerpiece of his
attack against judicial enforcement of constitutional rights.62 Waldron presents his
position most forcefully in an essay written in response to recent calls for
introducing into Britain American-style judicial review.63 He argues that even those
who fervently believe that individuals have basic moral rights to certain personal
freedoms should prefer legislative rather than judicial protection of these freedoms.
(Waldron's objection to judicial review, in fact, extends beyond the judicial
enforcement of unenumerated constitutional rights. He objects to judicial
enforcement of enumerated rights as well-at least as a matter of drafting a new
constitution for a society. But if a society already has a constitution with a written
bill of rights, Waldron might concede, along with Iredell, that the judiciary should
enforce its explicit provisions "in a clear and urgent case."64)
Waldron's key point is that believers in individual rights must not overlook the
basic right of each individual citizen to participate in political decisionmaking on
equal terms with every other individual citizen.65 As Waldron observes, American-
style judicial review is inconsistent with this democratic right since it gives an elitist
judiciary the essentially unrevisable last word on what the substance of the law will
62 See Jeremy Waldron, A Rights-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 Ox. J. LEG.
STUD. 18 (1993).
63 See ia
64 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,399 (1798).
65 See Waldron, supra note 62, at 36 (stating that "self-government and participation in
politics by ordinary men and women, on equal terms, is itself a matter of fundamental right").
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be.66 Waldron asks us to imagine ourselves advocating vociferously on behalf of
some human right (perhaps the right to have an abortion) and to imagine further that
we prevail in our advocacy of this right in a vote of the legislature, or a referendum,
only to have the legislation struck down by unaccountable judges because it
contradicts their belief about human rights (for example, a belief that even prior to
viability, a fetus has a right to life that defeats any abortion right).67 Is it possible
that in this circumstance we would think the judges justified in negating our
democratic victory, especially because we must consider our own understanding of
human rights at least as worthy of respect as theirs and our view has more support
than theirs?
Waldron acknowledges that "[t]hings might be different if principles of right
were self-evident or ifthere were a philosophical elite who could be trusted to work
out once and for all what rights we have and how they are to be balanced against
other considerations." 68 But such is not the case. As Waldron explains, the
disagreement among philosophers concerning the content and scope of essential
human rights is just as widespread and deep as it is among ordinary citizens.69
Moreover, philosophers recognize that their disagreements on these moral issues are
in good faith, not motivated by self-interest. 0 Similarly, there is no reason to think
that the same moral disagreements among ordinary citizens are not equally sincere.
After all, the moral reflections of ordinary citizens are not different in kind from the
moral reflections of philosophers. As Waldron aptly puts it "[p]olitical philosophy
is simply conscientious civic discussion without a deadline."71 If we are cynical
about self-serving motivations underlying the moral arguments advanced by
ordinary citizens in public debate, then just as easily we can be cynical about the
motives of judges. Conversely, if we continue to insist that our own moral
arguments are advanced in good faith, then we must be prepared to credit the claims
of others that their opposing moral arguments are also in good faith.72
6 6 See icL at 41-45.
67 See id at 50-51.
68 Id. at 49.
69 See id. at 29-31.
70 Seeid. at36.
7 1 Id at 35. On this important point, the philosopher Rawls is himself in complete agreement.
See John Rawls, Reply to Habermas, 92 . PHIL.. 140-41 (1995). 'Tfhere are no experts: a
philosopher has no more authority than other citizens .... Everyone appeals equally to the
authority of human reason present in society.' d.
72
It is no doubt possible that a citizen or an elected politician who disagrees with my view
of rights is motivated purely by self-interest But it is somewhat uncomfortable to recognize
that she probably entertains exactly the same thoughts about me. Since the issue of rights
before us remains controversial, there seems no better reason to adopt my view of rights as
definitive and dismiss her opposition as self-interested, than to regard me as the selfish
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Given the existence of good faith disagreement on moral issues, Waldron points
out that some decisional rule must be adopted to determine which side shall
prevail.73 A democratic vote of all citizens, or their elected representatives, is not
the only possible decision rule. The disagreement could be settled by a king
(philosophically minded or otherwise). But a democratic procedure in which each
citizen has an equal vote is the decision rule most consonant with the idea that the
deliberate convictions of each individual citizen are equally worthy of respect.
Waldron notes the irony of human rights advocates abandoning democratic
procedures in favor of elitist judicial review.74 Human rights advocates usually
premise their defense of individual liberties on the ground that individuals should
be trusted to make certain decisions about their own conduct But if ordinary
individuals deserve this trust, then they also should be trusted to participate equally
in making the necessary collective decisions about the extent to which constraints
on personal liberties are warranted to prevent harms to other members of society.
After all, some institution of government is going to draw the line between freedom
and constraint, and, if human rights advocates are correct about the capacity of
individual citizens to make intelligent choices about their own self-government
then why should human rights advocates prefer that this line-drawing authority be
entrusted to an elitist institution rather than a democratic procedure in which all
individuals participate on equal terms? Waldron summarizes this point:
If a process is democratic and it comes up with the conct result it does no injustice
to anyone. But if the process is non-democratic, it inherently and necessarily does
an injustice, in its operation, to the participatory aspirations of the ordinary citizen.
And it does this injustice, tyrannizes in this way, whether it comes up with the
correct result or not 75
Waldron recognizes that existing political procedures may not be perfectly
democratic. But these imperfections do not justify judicial review. 76 The
opponent and her as the defender of principle.
Waldron, supra note 62, at 50.
73 See id at 31-34. Waldron has stressed this important point in much of his recent work.
See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Circumstances ofIntegrity, 3 LEG. THEORY 1 (1997); Jeremy
Waldron, Kant's LegalPositvsm, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1535 (1996).
74 See Waldron, supra note 62, at 27-28.
75 1d at 50.
76 In recent decades the development ofpublic choice theory has exposed various potential
defects in political processes that strive to be egalitarian and democratic. For example, democratic
legislatures can become the captives of special interest groups. But these potential problems do not
necessarily justify more intrusive judicial review. For an especially thoughtful and sophisticated
discussion on the issue, concluding that, for all their flaws, democratic legislatures remain the
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institutional issue, as he observes, is "essentially a comparative one."77 Whatever
the imperfections of the ordinary legislative processes, they still are much more
democratic than rule by an unelected and unaccountable judiciary.
Thus, Waldron is the consummate contemporary Iredellian. His argument like
Iredell's, is institutional-the identification of rights should be left to the legislature,
not the judiciary. And, like Iredell, Waldron premises this institutional argument on
the skeptical view that disagreement about what rights individuals should have is
inevitable. Waldron is more explicit than Iredell in drawing the distinction between
intrinsic and extrinsic skepticism. 78 Nonetheless, Waldron's point about the
persistence of sincere disagreement among philosophers is essentially the same as
Iredell's observation about persistent disagreement among even the "ablest and
purest" of men.79 Neither side of the moral debate can prove that it necessarily has
the right answer and that the other side must concede. Given this situation, both
Iredell and Waldron maintain that there is no justification for the judiciary
substituting its moral beliefs for those of an elected legislature, whose moral
opinions are just as worthy of respect and can claim a more legitimate, democratic
pedigree.
III. THE DEMOCRATIC MIDDLE GROUND
If there were no middle ground between idealism and skepticism, I would have
to side with Iredell against Chase, and Waldron against Fleming. The idealists are
unable to refute the fact that citizens sincerely disagree about exactly what personal
liberties they should have and the extent they should be able to exercise these
liberties without government interference. Nor can the idealists overcome the
institutional argument that the fairest way to resolve this sincere disagreement is a
democratic process in which each citizen participates equally.
But there is a middle ground. It holds that judges may identify and enforce
unenumerated rights if but only if those rights are essential to ensuring that the
lesser of two evils, see Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALEL.J. 31 (1991).
77 Waldron, supra note 62, at 44.
78
That we need a theory of authority to settle disagreements is in no way a concession to
moral subjectivism or conventionalism or relativism. One can recognize the existence of
disagreement in society, including disagreement on matters of rights andjustice, and one can
acknowledge that some disagreements are, for practical purposes, irresolvable, without
staking the meta-ethical claim that there is no fact of the matter about the issue that the
participants are disputing.
Id. at 34.
79 Id. at 25.
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legislative process is indeed democratic. Thus, judges may insist that each citizen
have an equal vote in the election of representatives in the legislature, but judges
may not insist that citizens have the right, for example, to physician-assisted suicide
(because in no way can that right be considered essential to a citizen's equal
participation in democratic politics).
Perhaps the best example of a Supreme Court decision justifiable according to
this middle-ground theory of democracy-defining constitutionalism is the poll tax
case, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections.80 In Harper, a Virginia law
disqualified any citizen from voting in state and local elections who failed to pay an
annual poll tax of $1.50.81 The Court invalidated the electoral disqualification on
the ground that it unfairly imposed a greater voting obstacle on poorer, rather than
richer, citizens.82 The Court needed a theory of unwritten constitutional law to
justify this decision because the text of the Constitution strongly indicated that it
imposed no barrier to the Virginia law.83 Moreover, claiming it reasonable for a
legislature to restrict the voting rights of less affluent citizens, Justices Black and
Harlan wrote dissents that echoed Iredellian skepticism. 84 Nonetheless, the Court's
decision in that case has served the nation well. The Court's decision guaranteeing
all citizens, rich or poor, equal access to the ballot box has made the Constitution-
and the system of government it establishes-more worthy of the respect and
allegiance of all citizens, rich and poor alike.
A. Waldron and the Middle Ground
Given that Waldron premises his rejection of American-style judicial review
on his commitment to the basic democratic right of citizens to participate equally
in the formation of their society's laws, one might have thought that Waldron would
have embraced this middle-ground position of democracy defining
constitutionalism. But he does not. Instead, he claims that there is just as much
sincere disagreement among philosophers and ordinary citizens concerning the
essential requirements of a fair democratic process as there is concerning what
substantive rights citizens should have.85 Accordingly, Waldron contends that
80 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
81 See id. at 665.
82 See id. at 670.
83 Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment specifically contemplated state-imposed
restrictions on the franchise. However, even more glaring was the Twenty-Second Amendment,
ratified only two years earlier, which invalidated poll taxes for federal elections but noticeably
omitted any such barrier to poll taxes for state or local elections. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2;
U.S. CONST. amend. XXII.
84 See Harper, 383 U.S. at 671-86.
85 See Waldron, supra note 62, at 39 (stating that "[t]he truth about participation and process
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judges should let the existing legislative procedures resolve these disagreements
about which legislative procedures would be most fair, just as the existing
legislative procedures should be used to resolve disputes about citizens' substantive
rights
8 6
Waldron acknowledges that it might seem odd to entrust the existing legislative
process with the authority to decide whether or not to reform itself to become more
democratic. 87 (There appears to be some sort of conflict of interest here.)88
However, Waldron reminds us that some purely procedural authority must exist to
resolve disputes about what procedures to use. For example, if there is a dispute
whether the voting age should be 18 or 21, the vote to resolve this dispute must
either include or exclude the disputed age group. Moreover, whatever the alleged
deficiencies of the existing legislative process, it still will be more democratic than
a vote ofjudges who need not stand for any sort of election (and whose decisions
are practically unrevisable). Thus, in choosing a procedure for deciding whether the
existing legislative process needs to be more democratic, Waldron argues that the
existing legislative process is still preferable to judicial review. 89
The problem with Waldron's argument on this point is that it ignores the issue
of legitimacy-whether the society's system of government and law deserves the
allegiance and obedience of the individuals living in the society, or instead whether
these individuals are morally justified in attempting to subvert the system.90
Democracy is an essential element in securing the legitimacy of a political system.
Unless the processes for adopting society's laws qualify as democratic, the legal
system does not deserve the allegiance or obedience of the people it purports to
bind. Jefferson made this much clear in the Declaration of Independence. 91
So far, this point about legitimacy might seem to support, not undercut
Waldron's position. But although democracy is necessary for legitimacy, judges
is as complex and disputable as anything else in politices").
86 See id.
87 See id at 40.
88 For a systematic development of this point, see Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial
Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. Li. 491 (1997).
89 See Waldron, supra note 62, at 39.
90 Rawls gives the following definition of legitimacy: "[P]olitical power is proper and hence
justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all
citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideas acceptable to them
as reasonable and rational." RAWLS, supra note 34, at 217; see also THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALnTY
AND PARTIALITY 33 (1991). "The task of discovering the conditions of legitimacy is traditionally
conceived as that of finding a way to justify a political system to everyone who is required to live
under it." Id.
91 "Govemments," as Jefferson said, "deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the
govemed," and whenever a government becomes tyrannical "it is the Right of the People to alter
or to abolish it." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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have a special institutional responsibility for assuring the legitimacy of the laws they
enforce. For this reason, although the judiciary itself may be an undemocratic
institution, it must make sure that legislation is adopted through democratic means.
Why do judges have this institutional responsibility to assure the legitimacy of
the legal system? We must remember that judges are the ones who send citizens to
jail, or impose other penalties, if citizens have breached a law. When citizens
complain about the fairness of the law in question, the very legitimacy of the court
itself and its decrees are called into question. "You should not send me to jail just
because I chose to live under the same roof as my grandchildren," says Ms. Moore
to the judge who is about to sentence her for violating a nuclear-family zoning
ordinance. 92 "Any system of law that denies me the right to live with my
grandchildren is tyrannical, illegitimate, and not worthy of allegiance or respect,"
she continues. "If you, as judge, enforce this law, you too are being tyrannical and
lack legitimacy. Your decrees deserve to be thwarted and dishonored, to the extent
feasible, rather than respected and obeyed."
This objection is potentially powerful. No court should want its decrees to be
illegitimate, unworthy of respect or obedience. Instead, all courts should strive to
make sure that their decrees deserve the obedience of those to whom they are
directed.
If the process by which the law was adopted was democratic, then the court has
a ready answer to the charge of illegitimacy:
I understand, Ms. Moore, why you object to a law that denies you the right to
live in this house with your grandchildre&. But this law was adopted by a zoning
board whose members were elected by a vote in which you along with all your
fellow citizens had equal rights of participation. The zoning board considered
whether to open your neighborhood to extended-family housing, but decided
instead to make this one part of town just for nuclear families, leaving the rest of
town to different kinds of housing arrangements. We cannot say that the board's
balancing of competing considerations was inherently unreasonable.
In any event the process by which this zoning law was adopted was a
democratic one, and thus the law's legitimacy is unimpeachable. Had your side of
the zoning debate prevailed before the zoning board, you would not tolerate this
court's invalidation of the law on the ground that it failed to protect the right of
nuclear families to choose a neighborhood consisting uniformly of similar families.
Thus, you should not ask this court to invalidate the zoning law just because your
side of the debate did not prevail. A democratically elected zoning board is the
fairest procedure for resolving zoning disputes among citizens. For this reason, the
board's decisions deserve the respect and obedience of all citizens, no matter which
side prevails.
927Tis hypothetical dialogue between litigant and judge is derived from Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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While the losing litigant may not like to hear this response, it is enough to satisfy the
court that it does not lack legitimacy when it punishes a person for violating a
democratically enacted law.93
But if the process by which the law was adopted was undemocratic, then the
court has no such response available. Remember, the litigant before the court is still
complaining about the substantive loss of liberty as a result of an allegedly
tyrannical law. Now, however, in addition to this substantive complaint, the litigant
can add a procedural challenge. Therefore, when the litigant argues that the law
restricting her liberty is unworthy of obedience, she is correct because a democratic
legislature might have chosen not to adopt the law in question. To paraphrase
Waldron, a democratic legislature may or may not adopt substantively tyrannical
laws, depending upon one's own (contestable) conception of substantive tyranny.
But an undemocratic legislature is necessarily tyrannical because, by definition, it
deprives citizens of their right to participate equally in the formation of society's
substantive laws. Thus, to avoid a valid charge of illegitimacy, a court must make
sure that the laws it enforces were adopted by a democratic process.
To be sure, Waldron is correct to say that reasonable minds differ on how best
to structure a democratic process. For example, is proportional representation
preferable to the system of winner-take-all districting that we have in America?
Waldron is right that judges should leave the choice among alternative versions of
democracy to the operation of democratic politics itself. In other words, the decision
to adopt proportional representation should be made (if at all) using the existing
system of winner-take-all districting. It should not be imposed by judicial fiat.
But there are some political processes that no one could claim to qualify as
democratic. Even Waldron must acknowledge this as he is confident in condemning
judicial review and rule by philosopher-kings as undemocratic. As Waldron
describes, no political process could plausibly qualify as democratic that does not,
in some way, guarantee all adult citizens equal voting rights in referenda or the
election of representatives to the legislature. 94 Thus, this requirement of equal
voting rights is at least one condition that judges may insist upon to assure the
legitimacy of the laws they enforce.
93 1 assume here that the zoning decision was not infected with racial prejudice. Cf Moore,
431 U.S. at 510 (no evidence of any such prejudice in the record of the actual case). As John Ely
has persuasively explained, a "representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review" needs to
guarantee not only that the legislative process grants equal rights of participation but also that no
minority group is effectively shut out of the process because of systematic bigotry. See ELY, supra
note 8, at 135-81. This anti-discrimination principle, however, is arguably an enumerated right
by virtue of the Equal Protection Clause. See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to
Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747,789 (1991).
94 See Waldron, supra note 62, at 50. "[W]e should focus our attention on the individuals-
millions of men and women-who claim a right to a say, on equal terms, in the processes by
which they are governed." Id.
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It may still seem a bit paradoxical that a concededly undemocratic institution-
like an unaccountable judiciary-should have the power to insist that the legislative
process comply with the essential elements of a democracy. But, again, we may
invoke the judiciary's need to guarantee its own legitimacy. Whether or not the
judiciary is a democratic institution, it must be a legitimate one. Moreover, the only
way it can be legitimate is to make sure that the laws it enforces are the product of
a democratic process.
In this regard, if careful, we can usefully invoke some themes from Justice
Chase's opinion in Calder. Chase stated that judges should interpret a constitution
in accordance with its most basic purpose: to establish a social contract that is fair
for all citizens.95 In somewhat more modem terms, we might say that this idea of
a fair social contract corresponds to the idea of legitimacy: a government is
legitimate only if it deserves the assent of the citizens it purports to govem. In other
words, a fair social contract is one that all citizens have an obligation to accept as
legitimate and worthy of their assent (whether or not they actually grant this
assent).96 Thus, invoking Chase's opinion, we can affirm that the job ofjudges is
to construe the Constitution to make sure that it deserves the assent of those it
purports to bind.
The problem with Chase is that he took this idea too far. Chase believed that a
constitution could not count as legitimate unless it guaranteed certain substantive
rights, including rights to private property.97 This was Chase's error. Two hundred
additional years of history and philosophy has provided us with knowledge that a
constitution is legitimate-worthy of the assent and allegiance of citizens who must
live under it--so long as it establishes a fair, democratic process for resolving
substantive disagreements among citizens concerning divisive social issues,
including the extent to which private property should be protected. If a constitution
truly grants all citizens equal control over the formation of the laws that will govem
their relations with each other,.then citizens have no basis for complaint because,
given their equal status as citizens, they could not expect a greater than equal share
of political power. Thus, while Chase had an overextended conception of
legitimacy, there is nothing wrong with his underlying idea that the purpose of a
constitution is to establish a legitimate system of government, and, accordingly, the
interpretation of a constitution should be guided by this basic purpose.
95 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 386,388 (1798).
96 As Thomas Nagel has explained, the unanimity necessary for legitimacy is not "actual
unanimity among persons with the motives they happen to have," but rather "a unanimity which
could be achieved among persons ... provided they were... committed within reason to
modifyfing their claims, requirements, and motives in a direction which makes a common
framework ofjustification possible?' NAGEL, supra note 90, at 33.
97 See Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388 (stating "[t]he people of the United States erected their
Constitutions... to protect their persons and property from violence").
19981 1621
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNVAL
B. Idealism and the Middle Ground
Idealists, like Fleming, attack the idea of limiting the test of legitimacy solely
to the creation of a democratic legislative process. 98 They claim that any attempt to
limit legitimacy to procedural rights is self-contradictory because the value of
democracy itself derives from an underlying commitment to the substantiveprinciple that each citizen deserves equal input in the formation of society's laws.99
Moreover, idealists maintain, the respect for the decisionmaking capacities of
ordinary citizens implicit in the view that citizens should have equal shares in
democratic government necessitates a similar respect for the capacity of individual
citizens to make decisions concerning how best to lead their own lives. Thus,
idealists assert, if democracy is necessary for legitimacy, then rights to personal
autonomy are also necessary for legitimacy. As Fleming puts it, the idea of
deliberative democracy (i.e., responsible collective self-government) must be
supplemented with deliberative autonomy (responsible personal self-
government). 100
Taking these two points in order, I first readily concede that a commitment to
democracy necessarily rests on what some might wish to call "substantive" values.
In any event, democracy and the underlying idea of equal citizenship are certainly
not value-neutral. They necessarily entail a rejection of aristocracy and its
underlying idea that a certain elite segment of society should be entrusted with the
authority to adopt the laws that will govern all.
A problem with previous defenses of democracy-defining constitutionalism has
been suggestions that this democratic middle-ground offers a value-neutral form of
judicial review. Indeed, the most well-known proponent of democracy-defining
constitutionalism, John Ely, has done a particular disservice in this regard. In his
own critique of idealism, Ely appeared to say that any judicial reliance on the
insights of political philosophers would be inappropriate. Imagining the judges
citing political philosophers in their opinions, Ely quipped that, given the profound
disagreements among philosophers, judicial decisions ultimately would be based on
assertions such as "We like Rawls, you like Nozick. We win, 6-3."101 This quip
shows that Ely shared with the skeptics a deep distrust of any judicial reliance on
political philosophy, and one way to understand Ely's Democracy and Distrust is
98 See Deliberative Autonomy, supra note 31, at 28-29.
99 Waldron piggybacks on this idealist objection in his effort to show the incoherence of a
proceduralist middle ground. See Waldron, supra note 62, at 40.
100 See Deliberative Autonomy, supra note 31, at 30.
101 ELY, supra note 8, at 53. The reference is to Robert Nozick, whose bookAnarchy, Stats
and Utopia (1974) was a leading critique of Rawls's earlier work, A Theory ofJustice (1971).
While Rawls had attempted to justify extensive reliance on taxes to redistribute wealth from the
rich to the poor, Nozick argued that such taxes were akin to slavery.
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that it attempts to defend democracy-defining constitutionalism from thoroughly
skeptical premises.
But this attempt was doomed to failure because defending the democratic
middle ground with skeptical premises is an impossible task. Embracing thoroughly
skeptical premises of the kind Iredell and Waldron espouse leaves no basis for
claiming democracy is worthy of protection. Complete skepticism knows no reason
for preferring democracy to aristocracy, and thus could offer no justification for
judicial insistence that the legislative process be at least minimally democratic in
giving each citizen an equal vote.
Ely attempted to avoid this problem by claiming that the Constitution itself
values a democratic political process, and thus any judicial enforcement of this
value is not coming from the judges' own personal philosophical beliefs but rather
from the Constitution itself. The problem with this claim is that, while the
Constitution obviously does contain a number of provisions that implicitly endorse
the value of democracy, the text of the Constitution is not exclusively concerned
with establishing a fair democratic process. Rather, the text of the document
identifies a number of substantive values entirely independent of democratic
processes as worthy of constitutional protection. These include contract and
property rights as well as freedom of religion. Thus, with respect to the
identification of unenumerated rights, the text of the Constitution offers no basis for
preferring procedural rights to a fair democratic process over some set of
substantive rights analogous to contract, property, religion, and the like.
Ely tried to downplay the substantive rights identified in the text of the
Constitution. He called them an "odd assortment" and insisted that the Constitution
as written is mostly concerned about procedure, and therefore judicial identification
ofunenumerated rights should be limited to procedural rights.102 But this argument
seems especially weak. Most people are offended that the suggestion that the
protection of religious liberty is odd, and many people feel the same way about
contractual and property rights. Nor does it seem accurate to claim that the
document itself cares more about procedural than substantive rights. The
Constitution as written does not signal any such preference one way or the other.
Instead, it appears to treat all enumerated rights on an equal level.10 3 Thus, if there
is to be a successful middle ground that distinguishes between procedural and
substantive rights for purposes of judicial identification of unenumerated
constitutional rights, the defense of this middle ground must come, not from reading
102 See ELY, supra note 8, at 101.
103 It may be true that numerically there are more provisions in the Constitution concerned
with procedural rather than substantive rights. Even so, the Constitution does not create any
hierarchy of value among different constitutional provisions---the Free Exercise Clause has exactly
the same constitutional status as does the Nineteenth Amendment, which gives women and men
equal voting rights.
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the text of the Constitution itself, as Ely wished, but instead from fundamental
principles of political philosophy.
We need not be quite as fearful-or skeptical--of political philosophy as Ely.
Political philosophy has evolved considerably in the quarter-century since the
famous debate between Rawls and Nozick first surfaced in print. To be sure,
political philosophers still disagree on important substantive matters, and it would
be inappropriate for judges to choose sides in these areas of disagreement. But there
is a strong emerging consensus among contemporary political philosophers that
these substantive disagreements should be resolved democratically, using fair
procedures that give citizens equal participatory rights. As evidence of this
consensus, consider just the following major works written in recent years: Dennis
Thompson and Amy Gutmann, Democracy and Disagreement (1996);104 Brian
Barry, Justice as Impartiality (1995);105 James Fishkin, The Dialogue of Justice
(1992).106
Indeed, Rawls's own more recent work is much more modest in its claims than
his original book, focusing primarily on the fundamental ideas underlying a
democratic political system.10 7 Thus, we can distinguish, as Rawls does, between
the core and periphery of his philosophy. The core of Rawlsian thought-like the
basic idea of civic equality, that all citizens should be considered equals in the body
politic-provides the foundation necessary to sustain any democratic system of
government and so finds common ground with all the other contemporary
philosophers endorsing democracy as the fairest way to settle substantive
104
Democracy seems a natural and reasonable way [to cope with moral disagreement on
substantive values] since it is a conception of government that accords equal respect to the
moral claims of each citizen, and is therefore morally justifiable from the perspective of each
citizen. If we have to disagree morally about public policy, it is better that we do so in a
democracy that as far as possible respects the moral status of each of us.
AMY GuTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 26 (1996).
105
The upshot of this is that, where substantive justice is unavailable to provide a basis of
agreement, we cannot hope to find consensus on the basis of any other substantive criterion.
But that fortunately, is not the end of the matter ... [lt is hard to see why anybody of sound
mind should be asked to accept less than equal political rights. Generalizing the point, we
may sdy that, where substantive justice falls short, the search for agreement has to be pushed
up to the procedural level.
BRIAN BARRY, JUSTICE As IMPARTIALITY 109-10 (1995).
106 "A theory of legitimacy does not yield a systematic theory ofjustice. Instead, it yields a
theory of the fully legitimate political system." JAMES FISHKIN, THE DIALOGUE OF JUSTICE 203
(1992).
107 See RAwLs, supra note 36, at 35.
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disputes.108 Thus, unlike Ely, we need not fear that our defense of democracy-
defining constitutionalism relies on Rawlsian ideas as long as we confine ourselves
to the core of his thought and do not extend ourselves to the periphery of his more
controversial claims.
Moreover, democracy-defining constitutionalism must rely on Rawlsian-type
political philosophy not only to justify democracy as the necessary procedural
means for a legitimate system of government but also to sustain the idea that the
Constitution should be interpreted to be legitimate. This latter proposition, in turn,
stems from two subsidiary ones. First, the purpose of a constitution is to secure the
legitimacy of a society's government. Second, a constitution should be construed
in accordance with this purpose. Despite what Ely thought to the contrary, a
successful defense of democracy-defining constitutionalism requires the support of
both these propositions. But both these propositions are products of political
philosophy and cannot be derived solely from the text of the Constitution itself.
In this essay, I cannot explore in detail all the reasoning of political philosophy
necessary to sustain these two propositions. Suffice it to say here that they
ultimately depend on a basic principle of reciprocity, namely that citizens should
resist advocating the adoption of a legal regime that they would find objectionable
were they in the position of other members of society.' 09 This principle of
reciprocity, in fact, lies at the heart of Rawls's own political philosophy," 10
especially his most recent writing. Accordingly, I share with Fleming a belief that
a theory of unenumerated constitutional rights should derive from Rawlsian
premises. But these core Rawlsian principles need not entail ajudicially enforceable
right to personal autonomy (deliberative or otherwise).
Even though a defense of democracy derives from so-called "substantive"
values, such as civic equality and reciprocity, it does not follow that a theory of
judicial review is self-contradictory if operationally it confines itself to the
identification of rights essential to the existence of a fair democratic process rather
than extending itself to substantive rights of personal autonomy that a fair
108 Pawls's own acknowledgment of this common ground is best found in his work Reply
to Habermas, supra note 71, where he says that he, Habermas, and other contemporary
philosophers "agree that whether [certain] liberties are incorporated into the constitution is a matter
to be decided by the constituent power of a democratic people." Id. at 165. Rawls goes on to
emphasize that the appropriate design of a constitution cannot be settled by political philosophy
alone, but must also include considerations of a particular society's history and culture. Given
these remarks by Rawls, it seems as if Fleming may be claiming too much insofar as he suggests
that Rawls's work supports judicial identification of an unenumeratedright to personal autonomy.
109 For an extended discussion ofthe idea ofreciprocity, see GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra
note 104, at 52-95.
110 See RAWLs, supra note 36, at 16-17; see also John Rawls, The Idea ofPublic Reason
Revisited, 64 U. CHi. L. REV. 765,770 (1997) (stating that reciprocity requires citizens to propose
political principles that they "think it at least reasonable for others to accept!).
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democratic process reasonably might choose to reject. This operational distinction
is not incoherent. Even if it may be debatable at the margin whether some asserted
right is really essential for a fair democratic process, surely it is plain that many
asserted rights cannot be so described. In addition to the previous example of
physician-assisted suicide, it should be obvious that the right to reside with one's
grandchildren, however important to personal fulfillment, is not essential to one's
ability to participate equally in democratic politics. Thus, although the reason for
this operational distinction may be rooted in "substantive" values, the democratic
middle ground cannot be condemned as internally inconsistent just because it
confines the actual work ofjudicial review to rights necessary for a fair democratic
process.
Addressing now the idealist's second objection, I can also concede that a
citizen's capacity to participate equally in the formation of society's laws supports
the idea that a citizen has the capacity for personal self-government. But the
problem still remains in determining when an individual's exercise ofpersonal self-
government intrudes on the interests of other members of society, or when the
ordinary presumption of competence is overcome by special circumstances.
Agreeing wholeheartedly with idealists that government should provide citizens
with a zone of personal autonomy, I still maintain with Waldron that citizens
reasonably may disagree about exactly how to define contours of this zone. Thus,
even card-carrying libertarians need a voting procedure to resolve disagreements
among themselves, and there is no way around the point that the fairest procedure
for libertarians to adopt is to give each of them an equal voice in determining the
resolution of their dispute. In other words, libertarians, who object to paternalism
in personal decisions, should also object to paternalism in collective
decisionmaking, which is exactly what the idealist view ofjudicial review entails.
Libertarians are likely to respond, however, that the very legitimacy of
government depends on the government's respect for a zone of personal autonomy
for each individual citizen. Also, if I am correct that judges are supposed to assure
the legitimacy of the government, libertarians will seize this point and argue that it
is just as proper for judges to enforce unenumerated substantive rights of personal
autonomy as it is for judges to enforce unenumerated procedural rights of equal
participation in democratic politics. If legitimacy requires both deliberative
autonomy and deliberative democracy, as Fleming insists, then the judiciary should
enforce each prerequisite of legitimacy with equal vigor.II
The problem with this argument is that constitutional rights of personal
autonomy-unlike constitutional rights of equal participation in democratic
politics-are not an essential prerequisite for the legitimacy of government.
Respecting rights of personal autonomy may be necessary for a government to be
just, but legitimacy is not the same as justice-it is a narrower, more circumscrfied
1I See Deliberative Autonomy, supra note 31, at 3.
[Vol. 59:15991626
CALDER v. BULL BICENTENNIAL
concept.112 Justice is concerned with all the rights that citizens might have: rights
to wealth and income as well as various personal freedom (intellectual, sexual, and
otherwise). The separate issue of legitimacy arises precisely because different
citizens have different opinions about exactly what justice requires. A legitimate
government is one that gives each citizen's own views ofjustice a fair opportunity
of prevailing in the contest among competing views about justice. And precisely
because a legitimate government is one that establishes a fair process for resolving
disagreements among citizens about the substantive requirements of justice, the
rights necessary to secure a legitimate government are limited to those rights
essential for a fair political process and do not encompass rights to personal
autonomy that are not necessary for political participation. Thus, insofar as idealists
like Fleming maintain that rights of personal autonomy are necessary for legitimacy,
as distinct from justice, they are mistaken.
Moreover, to be absolutely clear on the crucial institutional point, in
endeavoring to identify unenumerated constitutional rights, courts should entrust
themselves only with the task of ensuring the legitimacy of the political system, and
most emphatically not with its justice. If they take on the role of guaranteeing the
justice of the laws of their society, they inevitably usurp the proper role of the
legislature, as it is the job of a democratic legislature to resolve disputes among
competing conceptions ofjustice. Obviously, where the Constitution itself has made
a commitment to one view of substantive justice over another, it is appropriate for
judges to enforce this commitment, but that circumstance involves the interpretation
of enumerated substantive rights, not the problem of identifying unenumerated
rights. However, if in this latter context, courts confine themselves solely to the role
of ensuring the legitimacy of the political system, then they are not usurping the
legislature's proper role because all the courts would be doing in this circumstance
is guaranteeing each citizen equal participatory rights in the legislative process.
Now, it still may be hard for a libertarian to accept the idea that the judiciary
should confine itself to enforcing the legitimacy of the political process rather than
guaranteeing the justice of all the personal rights the libertarian believes citizens
should have. But libertarians should recognize that all citizens have their own views
about the substantive requirements ofjustice, and they all feel just as strongly in the
correctness of their own views as the libertarians do in theirs. Libertarians should
acknowledge that they have no more right to impose their contested conception of
personal liberty on the rest of citizens than do other citizens to impose their
contested views on libertarians. Instead, libertarians, like others, should agree upon
a democratic process for resolving their disagreements about justice, even while
recognizing the risk that this democratic process may make some substantive
mistakes from their point of view (although not from the point of view of others,
who happen to comprise a majority). In other words, as strongly as libertarians
112 On the distinction between legitimacy and justice, see FIsHKIN, supra note 106, at 203.
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believe in the justice of certain personal liberties, they still should recognize the
primacy of equal citizenship and the obligation of respecting the results of a fair
political process for resolving substantive disagreements about justice. For this
reason, libertarians should accept that, in identifying unenumerated constitutional
rights, courts should be limited in securing the essential conditions of legitimacy,
which is confined solely to those rights necessary for equal citizenship in
democratic politics.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons just explained, even libertarians should find democracy-
defining constitutionalism preferable to the unadulterated idealism of Chase or
Fleming. The only lingering doubt is whether this democratic middle ground is
preferable to the pure skepticism of Iredell or Waldron. In the end, I favor the
middle ground for a philosophical reason: because democracy is necessary for the
legitimacy of law, and because judges are properly concerned that the law they
enforce be legitimate, it is appropriate for judges to insist that the legislative process
qualify as democratic. This philosophical justification for democracy-defining
constitutionalism is in sharp contrast to Ely's attempt to provide a skeptical defense
of the democratic middle ground. As we have seen, however, Ely's approach
necessarily fails to offer a reason to prefer the democratic middle ground to the pure
skepticism of Iredell and Waldron, and thus this philosophical defense is required
if democracy-defining constitutionalism is to secure itself a stable footing.
There remains the inevitable problem that people will disagree about exactly
what prerequisites are absolutely essential for a legislative process to qualify as
democratic. For example, a legislature might take the position that a right to an
education is unnecessary as long as uneducated citizens still receive an equal right
to vote. The judiciary, however, might be tempted to say that the right to vote is an
empty formality without at least some degree of basic education. But then we are
right back to the issue of which institution, legislature or judiciary, should decide
how much education, if any, is an essential precondition for democracy. 113
Obviously, the more that the judiciary insists upon in the name of democracy,
the weaker the defense of this middle ground becomes. But if the judiciary is careful
to confine itself to a few instances where the legislature seems egregiously intent on
subverting democracy itself, then the more the judicial intervention will be
justifiable despite the fact that the judiciary is not itself a democratic institution. A
useful project for constitutional theory would be to define, with some precision,
exactly what rights the judiciary would be justified in enforcing as guardians of
113 Elsewhere I consider this specific institutional question at some length. See Edward B.
Foley, Rodriguez Revisited: Constitutional Theory and School Finance, 32 GA. L. REV. 475
(1998).
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democratic legitimacy1 14 While this essay cannot undertake this project, I hope it
has shown why the democratic middle ground is the best hope for resolving the
debate concerning the judicial identification ofunenumerated constitutional rights-
a debate that, as Calder shows, has persisted in the Court for the last two hundred
years.
Of course, even if the democratic middle ground is a theoretically sound
position, there is the danger that in the hands of judges it will be abused and will
deteriorate into an excuse for judges to engage in an activist second-guessing about
legislative judgments about the substantive requirements ofjustice. The fact that,
after the famous footnote of Carolene Products in 1938, the Supreme Court's
commitment to democracy-defining constitutionalism proved short-lived (ending
with the unenumerated right of privacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut 15)
is certainly cause for concern.
I would argue, however, that the historical perspective we gain by
commemorating the bicentennial of Calder v. Bull gives us a reason for a different,
more cautiously optimistic conclusion. The idea of a democratic middle ground is
relatively young and embryonic when compared to the ancient and well-developed
positions of idealism and skepticism, as so well expressed by Chase and Iredell two
centuries ago. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that the idea of the democratic
middle ground-only tentatively expressed in a footnote-did not firmly take root
at first. But the history ofjudicial review in the United States, both the distant and
recent past, has shown neither the pure idealism of Chase nor the pure skepticism
of Iredell to be a satisfactory position for the Court to take. The idealism of Chase
gave us Dred Scott as well as Lochner, while the skepticism of Iredell would have
sustained the constitutionality of poll taxes as well as other restrictions on the equal
voting rights of citizens. Thus, both theory and history tell us that the democratic
middle ground deserves another chance.
114 Michael Klarman has begun this project. See Kiannan, supra note 88. In addition, there
is my own work on education. See supra note 113. 1 hope to make further contributions to this
effort.





3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386 (1798) [excerpts]
Justice Chase [at 387-89]:
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a State Legislature, or that it is
absolute and without control; although its authority should not be expressly
restrained by the Constitution, or fundamental law, of the State. The people of
the United States erected their Constitutions, or forms of government, to
establish justice, to promote the general welfare, to secure the blessings of
liberty; and to protect their persons and property from violence. The purposes
for which men enter into society will determine the nature and terms of the
social compact; and as they are the foundation of the legislative power, they
will decide what are the proper objects of it: The nature, and ends of legislative
power will limit the exercise of it. This fundamental principle flows from the
very nature of our free Republican governments, that no man should be
compelled to do what the laws do not require; nor to refrain from acts which
the laws permit. There are acts which the Federal, or State, legislature cannot
do, without exceeding their authority. There are certain vital principles in our
free Republican governments, which will determine and over-rule an apparent
and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize manifest injustice by
positive law; or to take away that security for personal liberty, or private
property, for the protection whereof of the government was established. An
ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the greatfirst
principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of
legislative authority. The obligation of a law in governments established on
express compact, and on republican principles, must be determined by the
nature of the power, on which it is founded. A few instances will suffice to
explain what I mean. A law that punished a citizen for an innocent action, or,
in other words, for an act, which, when done, was in violation of no existing
law; a law that destroys, or impairs, the lawfulprivate contracts of citizens; a
law that makes a man a Judge in his own cause; or a law that takes property
from A. and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to
entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed
that they have done it. The genius, the nature, and the spirit of our State
Governments, amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation; and the
generalprinciples of law and reason forbid them. The Legislature may enjoin,
permit, forbid, and punish; they may declare new crimes; and establish rules of
conduct for all its citizens in future cases; they may command what is right, and
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prohibit what is wrong; but they cannot change innocence into guilt; or punish
innocence as a crime; or violate the right of an antecedent lawful private
contract; or the right ofprivate property. To maintain that our Federal, or State,
Legislature possesses such powers, if they had not been expressly restrained;
would, in my opinion, be apolitical heresy, altogether inadmissible in ourfree
republican governments.
Justice Iredell [at 398-99]:
If, then, a government, composed of Legislative, Executive and Judicial
departments, were established, by a Constitution, which imposed no limits on
the legislative power, the consequence would inevitably be, that whatever the
legislative power chose to enact, would be lawfully enacted, and the judicial
power could never interpose to pronounce it void. It is true, that some
speculative jurists have held, that a legislative act against natural justice must,
in itself, be void; but I cannot think that, under such a government, any Court
of Justice would possess a power to declare it so. Sir William Blackstone,
having put the strong case of an act of Parliament, which should authorize a
man to try his own cause, explicitly adds, that even in that case, "there is no
court that has power to defeat the intent of the Legislature, when couched in
such evident and express words, as leave no doubt whether it was the intent of
the Legislature, or no." I BI. Com. 91.
In order, therefore, to guard against so great an evil, it has been the policy
of all American states, which have, individually, framed their state constitutions
since the revolution, and of the people of the United States, when they framed
the Federal Constitution, to define with precision the objects of the legislative
power, and to restrain its exercise within marked and settled boundaries. If any
act of Congress, or of the Legislature of a state, violates those constitutional
provisions, it is unquestionably void; though, I admit, that as the authority to
declare it void is of a delicate and awful nature, the Court will never resort to
that authority, but in a clear and urgent case. If, on the other hand, the
Legislature of the Union, or the Legislature of any member of the Union, shall
pass a law, within the general scope of their constitutional power, the Court
cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary
to the principles of natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are regulated by
no fixed standard: the ablest and purest men have differed upon the subject; and
all that the Court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the
Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act which,
in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract principles of
natural justice. There are then but two lights, in which the subject can be
viewed: 1st. If the Legislature pursue the authority delegated to them, their acts
are valid. 2d. If they transgress the boundaries of authority, their acts are
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invalid. In the former case, they exercise the discretion vested in them by the
people, to whom alone they are responsible for the faithful discharge of their
trust: but in the latter case, they violate a fundamental law, which must be our
guide, whenever we are called upon as judges, to determine the validity of a
legislative act.
